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The federal income tax system has become an important vehicle for social policy. Although tax 
expenditures are skewed toward middle- and high-income households, tax transfers to low-
income households increased substantially during the last decade. It is now common for low- and 
moderate-income working families to receive federal refunds of $2,000 or more. Research shows 
that many families view lump-sum tax refunds as “assets.” Thus, there are compelling reasons to 
leverage tax refunds for asset building. This paper offers specific recommendations for linking 








Middle- and high-income households have long benefited from an array of tax exclusions, 
deductions, and credits that amount to large subsidies for asset accumulation (Howard, 1997; 
Sherraden, 1991). Lower tax rates on capital gains, deduction for home mortgage interest and 
contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), and exclusions for employer 
contributions to retirement plans are prominent examples of tax policies that promote asset 
accumulation for the non-poor.  
Low-income households often receive little benefit from these policies, either because they have 
little or no income tax liability or because they do not meet the eligibility requirements. (Many 
do not own homes, for example, or do not have jobs with retirement benefits.) However, low-
income households may receive sizeable income tax refunds as a result of two federal tax 
credits—the fully refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the partially refundable 
Child Tax Credit (CTC). When a credit is refundable, any portion of the credit that exceeds tax 
liability is transferred to the tax filer as an income tax refund.  
CTC and EITC benefits are substantial. For the 2001 tax year, 26 million tax filers claimed $26.6 
billion in child credits (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002a). For tax year 1999, federal 
EITC claims totaled over $31 million, almost double the amount allocated for the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Spread throughout the year, the maximum 
2003 credit of $4,204 is equivalent to $81 a week.  
Largely because of the CTC and EITC, income tax refunds for low-income families have 
increased substantially. A family that received a refund of a few hundred dollars in the mid-
1980s might now receive a few thousand dollars. While many low-income families use refunds 
to finance routine expenses, refunds are also used in ways that promote longer-term economic 
well-being. For example, some families save a portion of refunds, some purchase cars, and some 
move to better housing (Beverly, Tescher, Romich, & Marzahl, 2002; Romich & Weisner, 2000; 
Smeeding, Phillips, & O'Connor, 2000). Because families often view refunds as assets rather 
than income, tax refunds may be leveraged to promote saving and asset accumulation in low-
income households. This paper presents a rationale for using tax refunds to promote saving and 
asset accumulation and offers several specific program and policy options. We begin with 
background information on the EITC and CTC. 
BACKGROUND 
Many low-income households qualify for both the EITC and the CTC, but there are notable 
differences between the credits. Here, we discuss history, structure, participation, and 
compliance for each credit. We also note the effect of nonrefundable credits on EITC and CTC 
refunds. 
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 The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit1
History 
The EITC was created in 1975 to offset the burden of Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes 
for low-income working people with children.2 At that time, the credit equaled 10 percent of 
earned income, and the maximum value was $400 ($1,367 in 2003 dollars). In 1978, the credit 
was made permanent, and an advance-payment option was created, allowing EITC-eligible 
individuals to receive a portion of their credits through their paychecks. Major expansions of the 
credit enacted in 1986, 1990, and 1993 increased benefits to low-income workers with children 
and created a small credit for childless low-income workers. The latest expansion, enacted in the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-16, “Tax Relief Act”), 
increases benefits for married families with children and will be phased in between 2002 and 
2008 (Greenstein, 2001).  
Structure 
The EITC is available to low-income tax filers (individuals or families) with earnings. It is 
intended primarily for parents of children under age 19, but low-income workers without 
children may receive a small credit. The amount of the credit initially rises with earnings, then 
reaches a plateau, and finally decreases with each additional dollar earned. Table 1 shows the full 
range of EITC benefits for tax year 2003. The average EITC benefit in 1998 was $1,500 for 
families with one child, and $2,300 for families with multiple children (Johnson, 2001). 
 
Table 1. Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, Tax Year 2003 




Rate Phase-Out Range 
With two or 
more children 
40% of first $10,510 $4,204 21.06% Married: $14,730–$34,692 
Not Married: $13,730–$33,692 
With one 
child 
34% of first $7,490 $2,547 15.98% Married: $14,730–$30,666 
Not Married: $13,730–$29,666 
With no 
children 
7.65% of first $4,990 $382 7.65% Married: $7,240–$12,230 
Not Married: $6,240–$11,230 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, 2002 
                                                 
1 Several states have earned income credits (Johnson, 2001). When these credits are refundable and generous (e.g., 
15-25 percent of the federal EITC), they may help families accumulate assets. In this paper, however, we focus on 
the federal credit. 
2 For more on the history of the EITC, see Hotz and Scholz (2001) and Liebman (1998). 
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 Participation 
About one out of every six families filing federal income tax returns claims the EITC (Johnson, 
2001). In 2000, 86 percent of EITC filers earned less than $30,000 (U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means, 2000). Research suggests that 80 to 86 percent 
of eligible workers received the EITC in 1990 (Scholz, 1994).3 Illiteracy, language barriers, 
distrust of eligibility notices issued by employers or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and fear 
of filing taxes due to underpayment in the past or outstanding child support payments are factors 
that could prevent eligible individuals from claiming the EITC. Additionally, those who have no 
tax liability may not be aware that they can claim the credit (U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Ways and Means, 2000). 
Using data from the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families, Phillips (2001) estimated that 
almost two-thirds of low-income parents (those with incomes below 200 percent of the federal 
poverty line) knew about the EITC. However, very poor parents, welfare recipients, Food Stamp 
recipients, and low-income Hispanic parents were less likely than others to know about the 
credit. 
Advance payment option: As noted above, workers with children may receive EITC benefits 
incrementally, through their paychecks. Currently, families may receive in advance up to 60 
percent of the projected total credit for a family with one child ($1,528 in 2003). Advance 
payment appears to be an attractive option because it can help families smooth consumption and 
cope with mid-year budget shortfalls. However, almost 98 percent of EITC refunds are 
distributed as lump-sum payments (Hotz & Scholz, 2001).  
Two small studies suggest that few workers know about the advance-payment option (Olson & 
Davis, 1994; Romich & Weisner, 2000). Even when researchers described the option, many 
participants in these studies expressed uncertainty. Some were afraid that they would end up 
owing money. Others liked receiving a lump sum and doubted that they could accumulate such 
large sums of money on their own.  
Compliance 
While the EITC has traditionally received bipartisan support, concerns about error and fraud 
have eroded support in recent years, especially among Republicans. The IRS estimated that 
between 27 and 32 percent of EITC claims filed for the 1999 tax year should not have been paid. 
Twenty-five percent of errors involved claiming an ineligible child, 21 percent were the result of 
income misreporting, and 17 percent involved the wrong person claiming the eligible child in 
families with complicated living arrangements (IRS, 2002).  
The rules defining qualifying children can be difficult to understand and apply, especially in 
divorced and separated families (see Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1998; Hotz & 
Scholz, 2001). One study estimated that about half of EITC noncompliance originates in 
households without children and is primarily the result of erroneous claims by noncustodial 
parents (Liebman, 2000). Many tax experts agree that the EITC is one of the most complex 
provisions of federal income tax, and EITC error rates among those who self-prepare and those 
                                                 
3 More recent research estimates that 75 percent of eligible households claimed the EITC in 1999, but the data used 
in this study have been questioned (see Burman & Kobes, 2002).  
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 who use paid preparers are about the same (O'Connor, 2001). Since 1995, the IRS has 
implemented new measures to reduce the EITC error rate, and the Tax Relief Act of 2001 
simplified eligibility criteria (Greenstein, 2001).  
Despite these efforts, a 2002 study by the Office of Management and Budget concluded that 
audits of EITC claimants were ineffective, and the IRS proposed new measures to address EITC 
noncompliance in 2003. Under a new “precertification” requirement, EITC claimants who fall 
into a “high-error” category will be required to provide documentation to verify that they are 
eligible for the credit.4 The high-error category includes single fathers, stepparents, foster 
parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles and other relatives raising EIC-qualifying children. Under a 
precertification pilot program, 25,000 tax filers who claimed the EITC on their 2002 federal 
returns will be required to precertify for the credit in 2004 (Goldwyn, 2003).  
The Federal Child Tax Credit 
History 
The CTC was created in 1998 as a tax credit worth $400 per child. At that time, it was partially 
refundable to families with three or more children whose payroll taxes exceeded the value of 
their EITC. Under the Tax Relief Act, the credit became partially refundable for other families.  
The Tax Relief Act also legislated a gradual increase in the credit, to $1,000 by 2010. Under the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, this increase was accelerated, making 
the credit worth $1,000 per child in 2003 and 2004. In July and August 2003, The Treasury 
Department mailed checks to most people who claimed the CTC for 2002, as an advance 
payment reflecting this increase.5 If the accelerated increase is not extended beyond 2004, the 
credit will equal $700 in 2005 and gradually increase to $1,000 by 2010, then return to $500 
beginning in 2011. 
 
Structure 
To be eligible for a CTC, a single or married person must have a Social Security Number or 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number and must claim an exemption for at least one 
dependent child under age 17. The credit begins to phase out when modified adjusted gross 
income exceeds $55,000 for married individuals filing separately, $110,000 for married couples 
filing jointly, and $75,000 for other households.  There is no limit on the number of qualifying 
children. 
To be eligible for a refund, an individual must have taxable earned income above $10,500. The 
refundable portion equals the lesser of two amounts: (1) the amount of CTC remaining after 
                                                 
4 To document relationships with children, claimants will have to submit marriage certificates. To prove that 
children lived with them for at least six months of the year, claimants will have to submit documents such as school 
or medical records listing both the filer’s and the child’s name and address and showing when these individuals 
lived together (Walsh, 2003). 
5 See Lee and Greenstein (2003) for discussion of families who did not benefit from the 2003 increase. 
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 eliminating tax liability, or (2) ten percent of the family’s earned income over $10,500.6 In 2005, 
the latter is scheduled to increase to 15 percent (Lee & Greenstein, 2003). 
To illustrate the parameters for 2003, consider a family with two qualifying children and $25,000 
in earned income in 2003.  This family owed $330 in federal income tax. After this tax liability is 
subtracted, the family has $1,670 of “potential” CTC remaining ($1,000 x 2 = $2,000; $2,000 - 
$330= $1,670). Ten percent of the family’s earned income over $10,500 is $1,450. The 
refundable portion equals the lesser of these two values, so this family is eligible for a refund of 
$1,450.  The family also qualifies for a federal EITC of $2,041, making their total refund $3,491. 
(Unpublished analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, personal communication 
from John Wancheck, September 15, 2003). 
Participation 
For tax year 2001, about 26 million families received $26.6 billion in child credits, including 
$4.9 billion refunded to 8.5 million taxpayers (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2002a). For the 
same year, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated that over 611,000 
taxpayers failed to claim CTC credits totaling $238 million (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2002c). 
Compliance 
Because the CTC is fairly new, there is little published information about compliance. For 
electronically prepared tax returns, the error rate is probably quite low because both the non-
refundable and refundable portion of the credit are automatically calculated. For paper returns, 
erroneous claims may occur due to confusion over the age limits for eligibility. (Children under 
the age of 19 qualify for the EITC, but only children under the age of 17 qualify for the CTC.) 
Research shows that mistakes related to qualifying children are a common error for several tax 
credits and exemptions (IRS Taxpayer Advocate Service, 2001). 
Effect of Nonrefundable Tax Credits on EITC and CTC Refunds 
While the EITC and CTC are the only refundable credits for low-income taxpayers, refund 
amounts are influenced by a number of nonrefundable credits and deductions. For example, the 
Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) is a large nonrefundable tax credit available to 
workers who pay for the care of a child, spouse, or other dependent adult. In 2002, qualifying 
families with one dependent child or adult were eligible for a maximum CDCC of $3,000, and 
those with more than one dependent child or adult were eligible for a maximum credit of $6,000 
(Joint Committee on Taxation, 2001b). Beginning in 2002, low-income workers were also 
eligible for the new Saver’s Tax Credit, worth up to 50 percent of a maximum $2,000 
contribution to retirement plans or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRS, 2001). These and other 
nonrefundable tax benefits reduce a low-income filer’s tax liability, resulting in higher EITC and 
CTC refunds.  
                                                 
6 Families with three or more qualifying children receive special consideration because some would receive larger 
refunds under CTC rules in effect before 2001 than under current rules. These families are permitted to calculate 
refunds using both sets of rules and claim whichever amount is higher. 
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 RATIONALE FOR USING TAX REFUNDS TO PROMOTE ASSET BUILDING 
This section provides evidence to support the argument that tax refunds can and should be used 
to promote asset building in low-income families. The rationale is three-pronged: First, research 
shows that low-income families do save in well-designed asset-building programs. Second, many 
families already view lump-sum tax refunds as “assets” rather than “income.” Third, the tax 
system has become a major mechanism for redistribution of resources, and policies that transfer 
resources through the tax system are likely to receive more political support than direct 
expenditure policies. 
Low-Income Families Save in Existing Asset-Building Programs  
Leveraging tax refunds for asset building in low-income households makes sense only if low-
income families can save and accumulate assets. Aggregate data show that most low-income 
households have low or negative saving rates and limited or negative net worth (e.g., Carney & 
Gale, 2001; Davern & Fisher, 2001). Low-income families clearly face resource constraints that 
make saving difficult. Still, data from numerous small studies demonstrate that many low-
income individuals value saving and assets. And, many manage to save and hold assets at least 
for short periods of time, until events such as childbirth, job loss, or vehicle breakdown occur 
(e.g., Beverly et al., 2002; Caskey, 1997a; Edin, 2001; Finn, Zorita, & Coulton, 1994; Romich & 
Weisner, 2000; Smeeding et al., 2000). 
Sherraden (1991; 1994; Beverly & Sherraden, 1999) has argued that low-income families would 
accumulate more wealth if they had access to well-designed asset-building programs. In fact, 
research suggests that low-income individuals can save and accumulate assets in Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs). IDAs are special savings accounts designed to help low-income 
and low-wealth individuals build assets to reach life goals and achieve long-term security. 
Account-holders receive matching funds as they save for purposes such as buying a first home, 
attending job training, going to college, or financing a small business (Edwards & Rist, 2001).7  
The most rigorous research on IDAs comes from the American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a 
multi-method evaluation of IDAs conducted at 13 IDA sites across the U.S. As of December 31, 
2001, the 2,364 ADD participants had monthly deposits (net of unmatched withdrawals) 
averaging about $19. With a match rate of 2:1, the average participant accumulated assets at an 
annual rate of about $700 (Schreiner, Clancy, & Sherraden, 2002). In multivariate analysis, 
Schreiner et al. found that income was not strongly related to saving. These findings suggest that 
some low-income families will save and accumulate assets if given the right incentives and 
institutional supports. 
Families View Refunds as Assets 
Theory and research suggest that people view lump-sum refunds as assets rather than income. 
According to the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler, 1992; Thaler, 1990), people 
                                                 
7 The federal government has supported IDAs by establishing and administering a five-year demonstration of IDAs 
(under the Assets for Independence Act of 1998) and by allowing states to exclude IDA savings from eligibility 
calculations for public welfare benefits (under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996). In addition, in 2000, there were over 40 state-level IDA programs and over 400 community-based 
programs in 49 states (Edwards, 2002). 
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 tend to view “irregular” income differently than wage and salary income, especially when the 
irregular in-flows are large. This theory predicts that people who receive sizeable tax refunds 
will consider saving at least some portion of their refunds or using refunds to make “special” 
purchases, rather than financing routine expenses. 
There is evidence that low-income families do indeed think about and use tax refunds differently 
than wage and salary income. Smeeding et al. (2000) found that 33 percent of a sample of 650 
EITC recipients planned to save at least a portion of their tax refunds; 16 percent planned to 
purchase a car, repair a car, or make car payments; 13 percent planned to purchase furniture or 
household appliances; 10 percent planned to pay educational expenses; and 5 percent planned to 
use their refunds to purchase homes or move. Consumer Expenditure Survey data suggest that 
low-income families often use tax refunds to purchase consumer durables, such as furniture and 
vehicles (Barrow & McGranahan, 2000). Two smaller studies by Beverly et al. (2002) and 
Romich and Weisner (2000) also provide evidence that low-income families use tax refunds to 
purchase and repair cars, buy furniture, move, and save.  
With these patterns in mind, some scholars have argued that people refuse the advanced EITC 
payment option because they want to be “forced” to accumulate lump-sums (Edin, 2001; Romich 
& Weisner, 2000; Smeeding et al., 2000). This, in turn, suggests that a variety of asset-building 
initiatives might be even more effective if linked to tax refunds. 
Tax System is Major Mechanism for Redistribution 
A final reason for linking tax refunds to asset-building programs is the recognition that the tax 
system has become a major mechanism for transferring resources to low-income families 
(Rogers & Weil, 2000). The trend toward redistributing resources through tax expenditures is 
likely to continue (Rogers & Weil, 2000; Sammartino, Toder, & Maag, 2002). Administrative 
expenses are usually much lower for tax credits than for programs such as TANF or Medicaid.8 
These efficiency advantages lead many policy-makers—particularly fiscal conservatives—to 
prefer refundable tax credits over other transfer programs. Tax credits are also compatible with a 
preference for limited government because they are viewed as incentives rather than mandates 
and because they allow politicians to take credit for reducing taxes (Howard, 1997). For all of 
these reasons, in the foreseeable future, the most promising mechanism for transfer programs 
will likely be the tax system, and asset-building programs that are not channeled through the tax 
system may not gain political support.  
                                                 
8 The IRS spent $7.3 billion in 1998 to collect taxes from 122 million taxpayers and 5 million corporations. In the 
same year, the U.S. Department of Agriculture spent about $4 billion to administer $21 billion in Food Stamp 
benefits (Sammartino et al., 2002).  
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 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LINKING TAX REFUNDS TO ASSET-BUILDING 
INITIATIVES 
For the reasons noted above, there is a strong case for linking tax refunds to asset-building 
initiatives. This section offers four key strategies and provides examples of program and policy 
options for each strategy. 
Strategy #1: Reduce the Burden of Tax Preparation and Filing for Low-Income Families 
Rationale 
Before thinking about saving and investing tax refunds, low-income taxpayers must first claim 
the credits they have earned. Increases in the size and number of tax credits targeted at low-
income families have made tax returns more complex, placing heavy burdens on low-income 
taxpayers and the IRS (Forman, 2001; Joint Committee on Taxation, 2001a). In a recent study 
funded by the American Tax Policy Institute, O’Connor (2001, p. 233) noted that successive 
amendments to the federal EITC have created “a thicket of rules, exceptions and exceptions to 
exceptions that directly affect the overall need for tax preparation assistance” (p. 233). Prior to 
1990, the IRS calculated the EITC for filers, but last year filers were provided with 50 pages of 
instructions and six worksheets to calculate benefits. Confusion over multiple definitions of 
“qualifying child” and eligibility rules for the EITC ranked as the second and third “most serious 
problems encountered by taxpayers” in 2001 (IRS Taxpayer Advocate Service, 2001).  
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that EITC filers rely heavily on commercial tax 
preparers. In tax year 1999, 68 percent of EITC filers used commercial preparers, compared to 
about half of all filers (IRS, 2002). Free tax preparation sites sponsored by the IRS and AARP 
file only about 2 percent of all EITC claims (O'Connor, 2001). While commercial tax preparers 
offer fast, convenient services, the cost is high. On average, national tax services such as H&R 
Block and Jackson Hewitt charge at least $100 for tax preparation and electronic filing, and an 
additional $75 to $100 for a refund anticipation loan (Berube, Kim, Forman, & Burns, 2002).9 
The proposed precertification requirement described above is expected to increase reliance on 
commercial tax preparers, and these companies are preparing to provide precertification services 
for a fee. 
Options 
1. Simplify tax provisions affecting low-income taxpayers 
The Joint Committee on Taxation (2001a) recently completed a large study to identify 
recommendations for simplifying the federal tax system. One of the leading recommendations 
related to families with children was to adopt a uniform definition of “qualifying child” for the 
dependency exemption, EITC, CTC, CDCC, and head of household filing status. According to 
Berube et al. (2002), one goal should be to create simple, one-page worksheets that allow low-
                                                 
9 Refund anticipation loans (RALs, often marketed as “rapid refunds”) provide loans in the amount of refund—
minus large fees—within a couple days of filing. Commercial tax preparers typically charge $30 to $90, resulting in 
annual interest rates of 67 to 774 percent. In 2000, an estimated 4.3 million EITC recipients received their tax 
refunds through RALs (Wu, Fox, & Renuart, 2002) 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis  8
 income filers to calculate credits on their own. Others have proposed a single “super credit” to 
replace these overlapping and confusing credits (Glenn, 2000; Sawicky, 2002).  At the time of 
this report, the Senate had passed legislation to create a uniform definition of qualifying child, 
but the House of Representatives had not (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003). 
2. Increase funding for free tax preparation services 
The IRS promotes free tax preparation for low-income tax filers through two types of volunteer 
clinics: Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) clinics, sponsored primarily by local 
community organizations, and Tax Counseling for the Elderly (TCE) clinics, sponsored by 
AARP. The IRS provides both types of sites with volunteer training, free electronic-filing 
software, and bulk quantities of forms and publications. TCE sites, which number about 10,500 
nationally, also receive about $3 million annually in grants from the IRS; VITA sites, which 
number almost 8,000 nationally, receive no IRS funding (O'Connor, 2001).  
The productivity of VITA and TCE sites is greatly limited by inadequate funding. In particular, 
despite the IRS’ push to receive 80 percent of returns electronically by 2007, few sites are 
equipped for electronic preparation and filing, due largely to lack of funds to procure computers 
capable of electronic filing. Electronic filing has several advantages for both tax preparers and 
taxpayers: 1) it reduces the amount of time required to prepare returns; 2) it reduces tax table and 
math errors; 3) it reduces the amount of paperwork taxpayers must submit to the IRS; and 4) it 
reduces the period of time between filing and receipt of refunds by seven to ten days. While the 
advantages are clear, electronic filing does place additional costs and burdens on VITA sites in 
terms of equipment, skills, and technical support. Thus, if these sites are to remain the primary 
source of free assistance for low-income filers, they must be funded at a much higher level. One 
recent study suggests that $100 million would be an appropriate level of support (O'Connor, 
2001). Federal and state governments might share this cost. For example, the federal government 
could require states with income taxes to provide matching funds for taxpayer clinics. 
3. Support the development and use of simple tax preparation software 
To provide low-income taxpayers with affordable tax preparation and electronic filing on the 
scale that is needed, governments and private foundations could provide financial support and 
technical assistance to nonprofit organizations to develop, market, and use simple tax preparation 
software. Two examples of this type of initiative are the I Can! Earned Income Credit Project 
and the Quicken Tax Freedom Project. 
The I Can! Earned Income Credit Project is sponsored by the Legal Services Corporation and the 
IRS. The Legal Aid Society of Orange County, California created a simple software program 
(available in Spanish and English) to help low-literacy, low-income workers claim federal EITC 
benefits. In 2003, the Society provided software, training, and technical support to at least 60 
organizations assisting low-income filers (Legal Aid Society of Orange County, 2002).  
The Quicken Tax Freedom Project is funded by the Intuit Financial Freedom Foundation. Lower-
income households can use Quicken® TurboTax®  to file federal and state tax forms at no charge. 
In 2003, the service was available to taxpayers who were eligible for the EITC or who had 
adjusted gross incomes of $27,000 or less. In 2001, over 1 million participants used the service 
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 (Intuit Financial Freedom Foundation, 2002). While this is clearly a valuable resource for EITC 
filers, many lack Internet access or the technical skills required to make use of the free software. 
The tool is readily available to organizations interested in helping low-income families file tax 
returns, but examples of such initiatives are hard to find.  
4. Establish partnerships with the commercial tax preparation industry 
A fourth option to reduce the burden of tax preparation and filing for low-income families is for 
governments and nonprofit organizations to work more closely with the commercial tax 
preparation industry. In 2002, the Department of the Treasury announced an agreement between 
the IRS and a consortium of commercial tax preparers to provide free online tax preparation and 
filing services (IRS, n.d.) under a new IRS “Free File” initiative. During the 2003 tax season, 
eligible households could prepare and file federal returns free of charge, using commercial 
software accessed through the IRS web site. Eligibility requirements were set by participating 
companies and typically pertained to age, income, and eligibility to file Form 1040EZ. Sixteen 
companies participated in the Free File Alliance in 2003, but the outcomes of this collaboration 
are still unclear. One concern is that businesses may have used confidential taxpayer information 
to market financial products, including subprime mortgages (Consumer Federation of America, 
2003). It will be important to evaluate whether this initiative increased the availability of free tax 
preparation and electronic filing services for low-income filers and other groups of taxpayers—
while also protecting privacy and other consumer interests.  
Strategy #2: Relax Asset Limits for Federal and State Benefit Programs 
Rationale 
Means-tested welfare programs typically provide benefits only to those with limited assets (see 
Table 2). Most programs exclude the value of a home, household goods, and a vehicle when 
computing assets. Under current law, EITC benefits are not counted toward asset limits for Food 
Stamp eligibility until 12 months after receipt, but they are counted toward eligibility for 
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and federally-funded housing programs two 
months after receipt (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2003b).  
Table 2. Asset Limits for Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 2002 
Program Asset Limit 
Food Stamps $2,000 
Supplemental Security Income $2,000 for individuals 
$3,000 for couples 
Federally-funded housing assistance $5,000 
Medicaid Varies by state 
TANF Varies by state 
Source: Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2002 
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While asset limits help ensure that assistance is targeted to those who lack other resources, they 
may also reduce saving by low-income families. For example, a family that receives over $2,000 
in EITC benefits could be forced to spend some of this money within two months in order to 
remain eligible for Medicaid. Those with savings in addition to EITC benefits will be forced to 
spend a greater percentage of their EITC benefits. A recent review of related research (Orszag, 
2001) identified three studies suggesting that asset limits reduce saving by low-income families 
and one study suggesting that asset limits have little or no effect. 
Options 
1. Raise and index asset limits and publicize these changes 
The federal government has not substantially revised asset limits since the mid-1980s. While 
states currently have no authority to revise asset limits for SSI, they can liberalize asset limits for 
TANF, Medicaid and Food Stamp programs through amended plans and waivers (Corporation 
for Enterprise Development, 2002). Some states have not yet exercised these options. 
Asset limits for federally-funded programs could be raised—perhaps to $5,000 —and indexed to 
inflation. In addition, states could liberalize asset limits to the full extent allowed by federal law. 
Finally, all changes to asset limits should be publicized broadly. At least one study suggests that 
many low-income individuals believe asset limits to be much more restrictive than they are 
(Marlowe, Godwin, & Maddux, 1996). 
2. Exempt funds in restricted savings accounts from asset calculations 
Federal law requires that assets in certain restricted savings accounts (e.g., IDAs funded under 
the Assets for Independence Act of 1998) be excluded from asset limits in federal means-tested 
programs (Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2002). Funds in all types of restricted 
savings accounts, including IRAs, 401(k)s, and educational savings accounts, could be excluded 
from asset calculations. Funds in restricted accounts are intended for asset-building and thus aim 
to promote self-sufficiency and longer-term economic well-being. Families—especially low-
income families trying to build assets—should not be expected to deplete these accounts when 
short-term crises arise, especially because penalties are imposed for early withdrawal. 
Strategy #3: Promote Saving Out of Tax Refunds 
Rationale 
As noted above, research suggests that many low-income families view refunds differently than 
wage and salary income and that a fair number plan to save or purchase assets with their refunds. 
Therefore, promoting saving out of tax refunds is a promising strategy. In addition, people are 
probably more interested in saving products or programs when they anticipate having money 
available (Beverly et al., 2002). Because low- and moderate-income taxpayers often receive 
substantial tax refunds, tax season is an opportune time to promote saving and participation in 
saving programs.  
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 Options 
1. Launch a national campaign to promote saving out of tax refunds 
In March 2001, the American Savings Education Council (ASEC, n.d.) publicized a “Save It, 
Don’t Spend It” message that included tips for making the most out of tax refunds. The 
Department of Treasury could partner with ASEC, the Consumer Federation of America, and 
other national groups to promote a similar message more broadly through extensive print and 
broadcast media. One model for this campaign might be the “Choose to Save” public education 
program created by the Employee Benefits Research Institute and ASEC (n.d.). This campaign 
includes public service announcements on radio and television, advertisements in printed media, 
and advertisements on public transit. 
2. Fund free financial education programs and promote them at tax preparation clinics 
Another way to promote saving out of tax refunds is to promote free financial counseling and 
education at tax preparation clinics. One of the largest VITA sites in the country, sponsored by 
Community Action Project in Tulsa, links interested EITC recipients to a series of classes for 
first-time home buyers (Smith, 2002). This initiative capitalizes on pre-existing and specific 
saving motives. Other financial education programs might aim to increase saving by teaching 
budgeting and debt-reduction techniques. When the organizations providing tax assistance do not 
have the capacity to provide financial education, they could partner with other organizations, 
such as Cooperative Extension branches, housing counseling agencies, consumer credit 
counseling services, credit unions, and local banks.  
3. Allow individuals to open low-cost savings accounts with tax refunds 
In 2001, 29 percent of families in the lowest income quintile did not have a bank account 
(Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003). This statistic is troubling because the “unbanked” pay 
more for routine financial transactions such as check-cashing and bill-paying (Caskey, 1994; 
Consumer Federation of America, 1997; Doyle, Lopez, & Saidenberg, 1998) and have trouble 
building positive credit histories (Caskey, 1997a). When asked why they do not have accounts, 
unbanked individuals often name economic barriers, including opening-deposit requirements 
(Caskey, 1997b). The opening-deposit barrier can be overcome if unbanked individuals are 
encouraged to open low-cost savings accounts with their tax refunds.  
One of the first programs to use this approach was the Extra Credit Savings Program (ECSP), a 
collaborative effort by ShoreBank and the Center for Economic Progress (CEP). Between 
January and April 2000, CEP offered free tax preparation and electronic filing at a ShoreBank 
branch on Chicago’s South Side. Eligible individuals—those who met EITC income 
guidelines—were invited to open no-fee, no-minimum-balance savings accounts by arranging to 
have their 1999 federal tax refunds directly deposited. Funds in ECSP accounts earned market 
interest, and a no-fee ATM card was available (ShoreBank and the Center for Law and Human 
Services, 2001). 
In the first year, 89 people (20 percent of those filing taxes at the ShoreBank site) opened ECSP 
accounts. In dollar terms, saving in ECSP accounts was short-term and fairly limited. However, 
there is some evidence that linking refunds with low-cost savings accounts is an effective 
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 outreach tool for the unbanked. Sixty percent of ECSP participants were unbanked at the time of 
enrollment, and for this group the most important account feature was the ability to use a tax 
refund as the opening deposit. Interviews showed that the ECSP offer tapped into pre-existing 
desires to have accounts and to save but that few unbanked participants were actively looking for 
accounts. Other evidence suggests that the program encouraged some unbanked individuals to 
develop on-going relationships with banks. For example, over half of unbanked participants used 
their accounts for something other than short-term storage of tax refunds, and 17 percent 
arranged to have paychecks directly deposited into their ECSP accounts in the first four months 
(Beverly et al., 2002). 
4. Encourage contributions to restricted savings accounts 
While ECSP-type accounts are likely to appeal to those who want traditional savings accounts, 
some low-income families may prefer more restricted accounts. Research suggests that many 
people (of all income levels) have trouble resisting temptations to spend savings (e.g. Beverly, 
Romich, & Tescher, in press; Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, & Sunden, 1997). Those who are 
saving for long-term goals might prefer a fairly illiquid savings vehicle.  
Linking tax refunds with IDAs is one promising option. As mentioned above, IDAs aim to help 
families save for particular investments, and other withdrawals are discouraged (Edwards, 2002). 
Programs that link tax refunds to IRAs and 529 plans also have promise. These initiatives are 
likely to appeal to families who already plan to invest portions of their refunds in home repair or 
purchase, education, microenterprise, or retirement, but not all households planning these type of 
investments would be willing to commit refunds to a restricted account. At the same time, each 
of these restricted accounts provides a financial incentive (IDAs provide matching funds, and 
IRAs and 529 plans receive favorable tax treatment.) If these incentives were publicized and 
direct links were created between refunds and restricted accounts, some low- and moderate-
income families would presumably choose to participate. Federal and state governments could 
probably increase saving for long-term goals if they provided additional matching funds when 
low-income filers used refunds to contribute to restricted accounts. 
Both public and private organizations have recognized the asset-building potential of tax credits 
like the EITC. Through the nationwide Community Based Partnerships program, the IRS is 
partnering with community organizations to (1) conduct EITC outreach campaigns; (2) provide 
free tax preparation assistance; and (3) encourage participation in financial education and saving 
programs, including IDAs (Thomas, 2002). The National Tax Assistance for Working Families 
Campaign sponsored by the Annie E. Casey Foundation has related objectives (Skricki & 
Fernandez, 2002). These and similar initiatives could also encourage IRA or 529 plan 
contributions. 
Strategy #4: Encourage Direct Deposit of Refunds 
Rationale 
The final strategy proposes a mechanism for promoting saving out of tax refunds: direct deposit. 
Direct deposit makes sense for at least three reasons. First, it helps people overcome the self-
control problems mentioned above. Direct deposit of tax refunds allows tax filers to precommit 
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 to opening an account or contributing to a savings vehicle before they receive their refunds, 
when spending temptations are not as strong. Once funds have been deposited in savings 
accounts, they may be “protected”, either because individuals view savings as “off-limits” or 
because there are withdrawal restrictions (Beverly, Moore, & Schreiner, 2003; Beverly et al., 
2002).  
Second, direct deposit greatly decreases the time between filing a return and receiving a refund. 
When an individual files electronically and arranges for direct deposit, she can receive her refund 
in as few as 10 to 14 days. If the combination of electronic filing and direct deposit were 
available widely and publicized broadly, the demand for costly refund anticipation loans would 
probably decline.  
Finally, increasing the use of direct deposit would lower costs for financial institutions and the 
IRS. Financial institutions would save because direct deposit transactions are less expensive than 
transactions with tellers. The IRS would have substantially lower check-production and postage 
costs.10  
Direct deposit is currently available to those who provide routing and account numbers on their 
tax forms. However, there are barriers to the widespread use of direct deposit. First, as noted 
above, many low-income families do not have bank accounts. Second, an individual may not 
want to commit her entire refund to a single account, especially if this account has withdrawal 
restrictions. The options described below would help overcome these barriers. 
Options
1. Make Electronic Transfer Accounts available to all low-income tax filers 
Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETAs) are low-cost accounts currently available only to those 
who receive federal welfare, wage, salary, and retirement payments. ETAs were created to 
increase the direct deposit of federal payments. These accounts have a maximum monthly fee of 
$3, a maximum overdraft fee of $10, and no minimum balance (except as required by state or 
federal law). Account-holders can make four free withdrawals and four free balance inquiries 
each month. There are no check-writing privileges (U.S. Department of the Treasury, n.d.). 
Participation by financial institutions is voluntary. The Treasury Department pays institutions a 
one-time set-up fee of $12.60 for each ETA account opened (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
2002b).  
Over time, similar accounts could be offered to all tax filers with incomes below a certain 
threshold. Instead of making up-front deposits to open accounts, individuals could arrange for 
direct deposit of income tax refunds. Even if demand were initially small, it could increase 
steadily through the outreach efforts of EITC campaigns nationwide.  
This initiative would be very similar to the Extra Credit Savings Program described above. 
Evidence from the ECSP suggests that this initiative would not substantially increase saving and 
asset accumulation in the short-term. However, by changing the way participants think about tax 
                                                 
10 In fact, the desire to reduce costs was the initial impetus for the federal government’s move toward electronic 
payment of benefits (Stegman, 1999). 
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 refunds, spending, and financial institutions (Beverly et al., 2002), the initiative might increase 
saving and asset accumulation over time. In addition, ETA accounts (unlike ECSP accounts) 
restrict withdrawals. This restriction may help families save tax refunds for longer periods of 
time. It is also likely to reduce account-maintenance costs for financial institutions.  
2. Allow direct deposit of refunds to multiple accounts 
A second way to promote direct deposit of tax refunds is to allow taxpayers to electronically 
transfer refunds to multiple accounts. This option is sometimes referred to as “bifurcation.”  
To understand why bifurcation is important, imagine a low-income individual who is saving for 
college while trying to pay off $3,000 in credit card debt. Suppose she is expecting a federal 
income tax refund of $3,450. Currently, she can choose to receive a check for the entire amount 
or have the entire amount electronically transferred to a single account. What if she could instead 
direct $1,000 to her debt repayment plan, $1,450 to her restricted education savings account, and 
the remaining $1,000 to her checking account—all in a single action? Bifurcation would allow 
her to precommit funds to saving and debt repayment plans before the money is in-hand, when 
spending temptations are less strong. However, she would not have to transfer her entire refund 
to restricted accounts. Instead, a designated portion of her refund would be available to spend as 
she later chooses.  
D2D Fund, Inc., has proposed a tax-refund bifurcation tool (Dailey, 2002). Based on a tax tool 
developed by Vanguard that allows investors to direct tax refunds to multiple investment 
accounts, D2D’s proposed tool would enable EITC filers to precommit some portion of their tax 
refunds to savings vehicles, using the same automatic savings method available to higher-income 
taxpayers and investors. As noted above, many EITC recipients in the study by Smeeding et al. 
(2000) said they planned to spend portions and save portions of their refunds. Thus, a tool like 
the one proposed by D2D would probably increase the use of direct deposit. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Research cited above shows that families tend to view tax refunds, at least in part, as “assets” 
rather than “income.” And, recent changes to the tax code have substantially increased income 
tax refunds for low-income families. These two factors give rise to promising opportunities to 
facilitate saving and asset accumulation by linking tax refunds to asset-building initiatives. This 
paper suggests four strategies to achieve this objective.  
Implementing these strategies will require active intervention on the part of federal and state 
governments and, often, partnerships among public, nonprofit, and financial organizations. 
Although each strategy alone may increase saving and asset-holding, employing multiple 
strategies would almost certainly yield optimum outcomes. Thus, we encourage state and federal 
policy-makers to adopt an integrated approach to asset building, by implementing several of the 
program and policy options suggested here. A truly comprehensive approach would also include 
policies that increase income, thereby increasing ability to save. 
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